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Scripture as a Source of Knowledge in Hinduism
Anantanand Rambachan
St Olaf College

Most of us hear the word "scripture"
without stumbling over it. Using it, we
give the impression, even to ourselves
that there is understanding of what th;
term means; that we all know what
scripture is. On reflection, it turns out
that this is hardly the case. 1

ONE OF WILFRED Cantwell Smith's
principal concerns in What is SCripture? is
to highlight the variety of texts which are
construed as scripture and the variety of
attitudes which human history reveals
towards such texts. We may begin by
noting, for example, the inappropriateness of
the term "scripture" (from scribere - to
write) for the Vedas because of its emphasis
on the written word as opposed to the word
which is heard and -preserved through oral
transmission. The Vedas are more aptly
referred to in Sanskrit as sruti (that which is
heard) or sabda (sound), and these terms
correctly underline the traditionally aural
character of these texts. 2 The Hindu
tradition, especially in the Vedanta schools
has relied on and elaborated the idea of srutt
as a prarniir!-a (source of valid knowledge)
and any unique features of this idea must be
included in the "richness and depth with
which human life has been imbued over long
stretches of time for most human beings and
societies, through their use of their
involvement with their scripture".3 '
As indicated above, the doctrine of the
sruti as a source of valid knowledge
received particular attention in the Vedanta
schools and my discussion of this doctrine is
confined largely to its formulation in the
Advaita (non-dual) tradition of Sailkara. I

will, however, make. some comparative
references to Ramiinuja and the Visistiidvaita
tradition where appropriate. Whii~ these
theological giants of the Hindu tradition
differ radically in their interpretation of the
Vedas, they do share certain common
assumptions about the nature of scripture as
a source of valid knowledge.
While there are important differences in
the way in which the authority of sruti is
conceived, the orthodox schools of Indian
philosophy include it among the sources of
valid knowledge and refer to it as sabdaprarniir!-a. 4 The term pramtL indicates valid
cognitions arid the special source of such a
cogriition is termed a pramiina. A pramiina,
therefore, may be thought of as a source· or
~ause of valid knowledge. In the words of
Sailkara, "a means of knowledge is or is not
such according as it leads or does not lead to
valid knowledge. Otherwise even a post, for
instance, would be considered a means of
knowledge in perceiving sound, etc."5 .
One of the very important consequences
of understanding and listing the sTuti, along
with perception and inference, etc., as a
source of valid knowledge js that the sruti
must satisfy, as far as possible, the criteria
of being a prarniir!-a. Scripture cannot claim
a special status which exempts it from being
subject to the same standards as other
sources. In the Advaita school, novelty and
non-contradictedness are considered to be
the essential characteristics of valid
knowledge. 6 Most of the emphasis,
traditionally, has been placed on noncontradictedness as the essential test of truth.
An invalid statement or erroneous
experience can be negated on the basis of
being contradicted.
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The view of scripture in the Hindu
tradition as a source of valid knowledge and
the necessity to meet the standards of such
knowledge require, it seems to me, that the
defenders of the sruti recognize a continuous
obligation to articulate, clarify, and defend
its claims in dialogue with world views
which either challenge or affirm its claims.
An advocate of a sruti viewpoint cannot be
indifferent to rival claims which are derived
from the empirical sciences or other
revelatory sources. A belief in the principle
of non-contradictedness should engender an
optimistic faith which is enthusiastic for
dialogue with other insights about the
ultimate nature of reality. Sruti-based
positions provide an excellent perspective
from which the Hindu tradition could
vigorously engage both secular and sacred
traditions in conversation. It is unfortunate ,
for reasons which I have tried to explore
elsewhere, that a lack of interest in the sruti
has also resulted in a loss of intellectual
vigour in Hinduism and in a lukewarm
desire for dialogue. 7 One of the common
claims of the contemporary Hindu
apologetic; for example, is that its world
view is "scientific", but we are yet to see,
from within the Hindu tradition, a serious
explication of its viewpoint in relation to the
conclusions of the empirical pramiina. 8
While admitting scripture as a source of
valid knowledge, the Vedanta traditions also
define the specific knowledge for which the
sruti may be regarded as authoritative. The
justification for a special means of
knowledge, like scripture, is that it provides
knowledge of those things which cannot be
known through any of the other available
sources of knowledge. For the Advaita
tradition, the two subjects which are
inaccessible to· all other pramanas and
known exclusively through the Vedas are
dharma and brahman.9 For Sailkara, the
nature of dharma, which includes
appropriate ethical as well as ritual action, is
known only from the Vedas.
The knowledge of one action being right
and another wrong is based on scripture
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only; for it lies out of the recognizance
of the senses, and there moreover is, in
the case of right and wrong, an entire
want of binding rules as to place, time
and occasion. What in one place, at one
time, on one occasion is performed as a
right action, is a wrong action in
another place, at another time, on
another occasion; none therefore can
know, without scripture, what is either
right or wrong. 10

The sruti, as we noted above, also
serves as a valid source for our knowledge
of brahman (the limitless) and it is in
relation to the revelation of brahman that the
Vedanta traditions articulate the most
detailed rationale for the nature and
necessity of the scripture as a pramana. The
cornerstone of SaiIkara's argument for
scripture as a valid means of knowledge for
brahman is that given the nature of brahman
as nirgul'}a (free from all qualities), a
pramlll'}a which consists of words is the only
logical means. Sound, sensation, form, taste,
and scent are the respective spheres of the
sense organs. Since brahman, however, has
no sound, touch, form, taste, or smell, it is
outside the domain of the sense organs.
Moreover, argues SaiIkara, perceptual
knowledge requires a process of objectifying
the thing to be known, and brahman, being
the eternal subject of all experiences,cannot
be objectified. Although Ramanuja differs
from SaiIkara in his understanding of the
nature of brahman, it is significant to note
that he refutes, in no uncertain terms, the
possibility of knowing 'brahman through
perception. 11
Since· perception is an inappropriate
means of knowledge for brahman, the view
of both Sailkara and Ramanuja is that
inference, which is more or less dependent
on perception for its data, will not be
helpful. Ramanuja sums up the basic
Vedanta viewpoint.
Thus the inference of a creative Lordwhich claims to be in agreement with
observation is refuted by reasoning
which is itself in agreement with
observation, and we hence .conclude that
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Scripture is the only source of
knowledge with regard to a supreme
soul that is the Lord of all and
constitutes the highest Brahman. What
SCripture tells us of is a being which
comprehends within itself infinite,
altogether unsurpassable excellences
such as omnipotence and so on, is
antagonistic to all evil, and totally
different in character from whatever is
cognised by other means of
knowledge. 12

Sruti fulfils the criteria of being a valid
source of knowledge by generating a fruitful
knowledge which cannot be obtained
through another source and which is
uncontradicted.
Is or is not certain and fruitful
knowledge generated by passages setting
forth the nature of the Self, and if so,
how can they lose their authority? Do
you not see the result of knowledge in
the removal of all the evils which are
the root of transmigration, such as
ignorance, grief, delusion and fear?13
Since SaTIkara' s arguments for scripture
as a source of valid knowledge are mainly
epistemological (Le. that scripture fulfils the
criteria of being a pramii'!a), it is important
to. underline the point that the Advaita
tradition does not try to establish the validity
of the texts by reference to God's
omniscience. The reason is that since the
tradition finds it impossible to establish the
existence and nature of God through
inferential reasoning, one ends up with a
"the
hopelessly circular argument,
omniscience of the Lord being established
on the doctrine of Scripture, and the
authority of Scripture again being
established on the omniscience of the
Lord" .14
The admission of scripture as a source
of valid knowledge in the Hindu tradition
does not imply the redundancy of reason.
While SaDkara and Ramanuja reject the
argument that the nature of brahman may be
ascertained through inferential reasoning
independent of scripture, they are both

supportive of the use of argument which is
in harmony with revelation. Inferential
reasoning independent of sruti is
inconclusive since brahman possesses no
perceptible characteristics.· Stimtinyatodrstanumtina, however, which corresponds
ih ·modern logic to analogical reasoning, is
widely employed by Vedanta commentators.
This type of reasoning is not viewed as a
pramiina, but operates as an ancillary to a
pramiina. Its function is to bolster the source
of knowledge. Reason has to be used in
ascertaining and clarifying the meaning of
scripture in debates with schools that accept
the authority of the sruti but offer different
interpretations. It also has a wider role in
defending scripture against rival schools
which reject both its authority as a source of
knowledge and its viewpoint. Riimanuja
again sums up the Vedanta position.
A theory which rests exclusively on
arguments derived from human reason
may, .at some time or place, be
disestablished by arguments devised by
people more skilful than you in
reasoning; and thus there is no getting
over the objection founded on the
invalidity of all mere argumentation.
The conClusion from all this is that with
. regard to supersensuous matters,
Scripture alone is authoritative,· and
reasoning is to be applied only to· the
support of SCripture. IS

How does the proponent of the sruti
respond when there is conflict between
human experience and s~ripture? If the issue
cannot be resolved by mutually acceptable
forms of argument, the proponent will
proffer the uniqueness of scripture as a
means of knowledge. In the Vedtinta-Stltras,
for example, the question of brahman
creating the world without any organs of
action is raised since one does not see beings
without bodily organs creating anything.
While noting that one should be cautious
about generaliz~tions from experience,
Sailkara falls back upon the authority of

pramliTfa.

I

The transcendent highest Brahman can
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be fathomed by means of Scripture
only, not by mere reasoning. Nor are
we obliged to assume that the capacity
of one being is exactly like that which is
observed in another. I6
One of the important features of the
Vedanta characterization of scripture as a
pramiif}a which may also open fruitful areas
for dialogue with the Christian tradition is
the concern to circumscribe the scripture's
'sphere of authority. Commentators, like
Sailkara, identify the subject matter for
which scripture is a source of valid
knowledge, but also the topics for which it
does not speak authoritatively. In this sense,
the srud is like all other pramiif}Qs in having
a limited revelatory role.
Scripture, as noted above, is intended
for the revelation of dharma and brahman,
both of which cannot be known through
another source. Its purpose is not to disclose
matters within the range of human
experience, ascertainable through any of the
other pramiif}Qs, like perception or
inference. If a scriptural statement,
therefore, contradicts an established fact of
everyday human experience, the former
cannot be considered authoritative since such
a matter would be outside its sphere of
authority. Sailkara is clear on this point.

I

I

Sruti is an authority only in matters not
perceived by means of ordinary
instruments of knowledge such as
pratyaksha or immediate perception;i.e., it is an authority as to the mutual
relation of things as means to ends, but
not in matters lying within the range of
pratyaksha; indeed, sruti is intended as
an authority only for knowing what lies
beyond the range of human knowledge
... A hundred srutis may declare that
fire is cold or that it is dark; still they
possess no authority in the matter. 17

If sruti did describe fire as being cold or
dark, we would be obliged to construe its
meaning figuratively since the purpose of
scripture is not to create anything anew or to
reverse the nature of anything. The texts are
fundamentally revelatory in purpose and are
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concerned with expressing things as they
are.
Things in the world are known to
possess certain fixed characteristics such
as grossness or fmeness. By citing them
as examples the scripture seeks to tell
us about some other thing which does
not contradict them. They would not
cite an example from life if they wanted
to convey an idea of something
contradictory to it. Even if they did, it
would be to no purpose, for the
example would be different from the
thing to be explained. You cannot prove
that fire is cold, or that the sun does not
give heat, even by citing a hundred
examples, for the facts would already
be known to be otherwise through
another means of knowledge. And one
means of knowledge does not contradict
. another, for it only tells us about those
things that cannot be known by another
means. Nor can scripture speak about
an unknown thing without having
recourse to conventional words and
their meanings. 18
The Advaita tradition is very specific
about some of the topics which are. not
authoritatively revealed in the scripture. It is
not the purpose of scripture, for example, to
inform us of the details and order of the
creation of the world since we neither
observe nor are told by the texts that the
welfare of human beings depends on this
. kind of knowledge. Such descriptions,
argues Sailkara, really have as their aim the
revelation of the nature 'of the absolute. 19
It is also not the concern of scripture to
describe the nature of the human being with
regard to those characteristics which are
available for observation. "The Lord, on tlie
other hand, about whom ordinary experience
tells us nothing, is to be c~:msidered as the
special topic of all scriptural passages. "20
The case for scripture as a means of
knowledge in the Hindu tradition is based on
the belief that there are realities (or a
reality) whose true nature cannot be
ascertained by other ways of knowing. Such
a premise, it appears to me, is intellectually
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defensible, especially when scripture is
willing to subject its claims to assessment by
other sources of knowledge and to question
the conclusions of these sources.
. The argument that each pramii"f!O- has a
unique sphere of authority may appear to be
one which inhibits dialogue among other
religious traditions and between religion and
the empirical sciences. It would seem to me,
however, that the common interest which
religions and the empirical sciences have in
the nature of reality make them natural
dialogue partners. If a religion understands
the authoritative sources of other religious
traditions as rival pramiinas, there is an
obvious epistemological· necessity for
dialogue to understand and explain their
similar or dissimilar points of view. A
similar case may be made for dialogue with
the empirical sciences when the propositions
of the latter converge with or stand opposed
to religious claims. The assumption that
valid sources of knowledge cannot contradict
each other suggests that human inquiry, in.
the widest sense, will some day converge,
but in the meantime, the prarniif!.a approach
urges us to account for our differences and
similarities. The view of scripture as a
pramii"f!O-, provides a sound basis for
dialogue and holds out the possibility that all
who are engaged in the quest for knowledge,
in whatever diScipline, may be enriched by
each other.
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Notes
1.
2.
3.

4.

w.e.

Smith, "What is Scripture?,
Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993, p. L
A student of the Vedas is referred to,
traditionally, as srotriya (one whohears).
W.e. Smith, "What is Scripture?, p.16.
While Smith argues for attentiveness to
diversity in the materials which are regarded
as sCripture and in their interpretation
throughout history, there is no discussion in
his work about the significant Hindu notion
of the sruti as pramiina. The latter term does
not occur in his discussion of the Hindu
tradition.
In this article 1 use the worlds sruti and
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12.
13.
14.

sabda to refer to the Vedas. It must be~
recognized, however, that the term sruti as
revelation is not limited to the Vedic texts.
The Brhadarafiyaka Upanisad: with the
comme~tary of Salikaracdrya, Swami
Madhavananda (transl.), Calcutta: Advaita
Ashrama, 1975, 11.1.20, p.214. Hereafter
abbreviated BR.U.B.
See e.g. The Vedanta Parib~a of
Dharmaraja Adhvarfndra, Swami
Madhavananda (transl.), Belur Math,
Howrah:
The Ramakrishna Mission
Saradapitha, 1972, Ch.l, p.5.
See Anantanand Rambachan, The Limits of
Scripture: Vivekananda's Reinterpretation of
the Authority of the Vedas, Honolulu:
University of Hawaii Press, 1994.
This is also lamentable because of the
significant number of people from the IIidian
subcontinent who work in the fields of
scientific and technological research.
See, e.g., The Vedanta Sutras: with the
commentary of Salikaracarya, George
Thibaut (transl.), Sacred Books of the East
Series, Vol. 34, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass,
1988, 11.1.6. Hereafter abbreviated VSS.
VSS, Vo1.38, III. 1.25. The existence of the
self in future lives and the appropriate
means for attaining happiness and avoiding f
unhappiness in those lives fall within the
sphere of dharma and are known only from
the Vedas.
The Vedanta-Sutras: with the commentary of
Ramtinuja, George Thibaut (transl.),Sacred
Books of the East Series, Vol. 48, Delhi:
Motilal Banarsidass, 1990, 1.1.3. Hereafter
abbreviated VSR. While both SaIikara and
Ramanuja see the words of Vedas as the
authoritative source for the knowledge ofthe
absolute, there is considerable dis.cussion on
the problem of language relation to brahman
and the special ways in which words are
used in communicating valid knowledge of
the limitless. This subject exceeds the scope
of this article and the reader may want to
consult Anantanand Rambachan, Accomplishing the Accomplished: The Vedas as a
Source of Valid Knowledge inSafikara,
Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1991.
See, in particular, Ch.3.
Ibid.
BR.U.B. I.iv.7.
VSS 11.2.38.
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15. VSR 11.1.12.
16. VSS 11.1.31. On the same sutra RfunfulUja

comments as follows: "That for which the
sacred word is the only means of
knowledge, and which is different from all
other things, is capable of producing those
effects also of the instrumental means of
which it is destitute". See also their
respective commentaries on surra 11.1.27.

17. A. Mahadeva Sastry (trans!.), The
Bhagavadgfta: with the commentary of
Saflkaracarya, Madras: Samata Books,
1977, 18:66.
18. BR.U.B. 11.1.20. It is obvious that in the
view of SaTIkara, the revelations of scripture
are not opposed to fact.
19. See VSS 1.4.14.
20. Ibid., 1.3.7.
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